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ABSTRACT 
 
Absorptive capacity is frequently highlighted as a key determinant of knowledge transfer 
within MNEs. But how individual behaviour translates into absorptive capacity at the 
subsidiary level, and exactly how this is contingent on subsidiaries’ social context, remains 
under-addressed. This not only limits our understanding of the relationship between 
individual and organizational level absorptive capacity, it also hampers further research on 
potentially relevant managerial and organizational antecedents, and limits the implications we 
can draw for practitioners that seek to increase their organization’s capacity to put new 
knowledge to use. To address this shortcoming we conduct an in-depth comparative case 
study of a headquarters-initiated knowledge transfer initiative at two subsidiaries of the same 
MNE. The findings demonstrate that social interaction is a prerequisite for subsidiary 
absorptive capacity as it enables employees to participate in the transformation of new 
knowledge to the local context and the development of local applications. Second, the 
findings illustrate how organizational conditions at the subsidiary level can impact subsidiary 
absorptive capacity by enabling or constraining local interaction patterns. These insights 
contribute to the absorptive capacity literature by demonstrating the scale and scope of social 
interaction as a key link between individual- and organizational-level absorptive capacity. 
 
Key words: absorptive capacity; social interaction; subsidiary learning 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ability to generate and transfer knowledge is frequently highlighted as a key capability of 
the multinational enterprise (MNE) (e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1993; Grant, 1996). It should 
therefore come as no surprise that intra-MNE knowledge transfer has emerged as one of the 
main research topics within research on MNEs (Foss and Pedersen, 2004; Pisani, 2009). Yet 
while the dominant conceptualization of intra-MNE knowledge transfer, the sender-receiver 
perspective (Carlile, 2004; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009), has generated valuable 
research on for instance the relation between sender and receiver and the richness of the 
transfer channel (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Almeida and Phene, 2004; Schulz, 
2003), it has also diverted attention from the micro-level origins of subsidiary learning. As a 
result we still know little about, for instance, the organizational antecedents that enable or 
constrain subsidiary learning and how subsidiary learning relates to the behaviour of 
individual actors (Foss and Pedersen, 2004). 
 Making better use of the absorptive capacity construct—the combination of a 
receiving unit’s ability and motivation to recognize, assimilate and apply new knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Minbaeva et al., 2003)—may help shed light on the foundations 
of subsidiary learning. In fact, absorptive capacity of the receiving unit is already frequently 
highlighted as a key determinant of knowledge transfer within MNEs (e.g., Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Minbaeva et al., 2003) and subsidiaries’ innovativeness and profitability 
(e.g., Tsai, 2001; Phene and Almeida, 2008). However, the explanatory power of absorptive 
capacity itself is limited by insufficient attention to the link between the individual and 
organizational level. What remains particularly unclear is how individual behaviour translates 
to absorptive capacity of the organizational unit. As a result, our understanding of how new 
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knowledge is assimilated internally and the role of individual actors and organizational 
conditions remains incomplete. 
To better understand the micro-level origins of absorptive capacity, we conduct an in-
depth comparative case study of two subsidiaries in the context of a centrally initiated 
knowledge transfer within the same MNE. The two subsidiaries are very similar, yet 
demonstrate differences in their capability to learn and to sustain the transfer initiative. While 
the German subsidiary displays extensive learning across organizational levels, the British 
subsidiary displays only limited learning and the transfer initiative is not sustained locally.  
We find that the difference in the subsidiaries’ capacity to absorb and apply 
knowledge is strongly linked to differences in social interaction patterns, such as differences 
in social cohesion, the extent (or scale) of interaction and the diversity (or scope) of 
interacting employees. In particular, the findings illustrate that social interaction is crucial in 
enabling individual actors with diverse knowledge to participate in the transformation of 
knowledge to the local context. This suggests that social interaction is not merely facilitative 
of organizational-level absorptive capacity (cf. Zahra and George, 2002; Todorova and 
Durisin, 2007) but a prerequisite to it: It performs the key role of linking individual 
absorptive capacity to that of the organizational unit. This complements work that highlights 
the role of interaction between sender and receiver (e.g., Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009; 
Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001), by illustrating that variation 
in intra-unit interaction patterns may be similarly important for understanding learning and 
innovation outcomes. As MNE dyads often display high relative absorptive capacity due to 
shared dominant logics and structures (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), variation in intra-unit 
social interaction patterns may be particularly relevant in explaining differences in learning 
between MNE units. 
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The findings also suggest how the ability and willingness of individuals to participate 
in knowledge transformation relates to organizational conditions, such as incentive systems, 
leadership style and structural demarcations. Such conditions impact subsidiary success in the 
integration of new knowledge, and whether subsidiary learning efforts are sustained locally, 
by facilitating or constraining social interaction, and hence actors’ involvement in the 
transformation of new knowledge. This extends recent work by Gooderham, Minbaeva and 
Pedersen (2011), who suggest that the effect of various governance mechanisms on 
knowledge transfer is mediated by their impact on social structure, and contributes to calls for 
a deeper understanding of how organizational conditions impact organizational knowledge 
processes (Foss and Pedersen, 2004; Foss, 2007). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section we 
discuss the literature on knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity. We then present the 
research methodology and introduce our research sites. The empirical findings—differences 
in learning patterns within the same MNE—are presented in section 4. In section 5 we 
discuss our findings and develop a set of propositions. In section 6 we present our 
conclusions and highlight the contribution of the study to the literature on absorptive capacity 
and MNE knowledge processes. 
 
SUBSIDIARY LEARNING AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
 
The dominant conceptualization of knowledge transfer within MNEs is that knowledge flows 
are promoted or impeded depending on characteristics of the sending unit, the transmission 
channel, the transfer message, the receiving unit, and the transmission context (Szulanski, 
2000). Accordingly, MNE research has particularly furthered our understanding of how intra-
MNE knowledge flows differ depending on characteristics of, for instance, the sending and 
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receiving unit (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Phene and Almeida, 2008; Szulanski, 1996), 
the knowledge to be transferred (Schulz, 2003; Dhanaraj et al., 2004) and the richness of the 
transfer channel (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen and Li, 2004; 
Hansen and Løvås, 2004). However, the implicit emphasis on the transfer process has also 
limited research from focusing on the sub-organizational conditions that affect MNE 
learning. This limits our understanding of MNE knowledge processes in at least three 
respects. 
 First, there is still little understanding of the role of individual actors in MNE 
knowledge adoption and integration, in particular how their social interaction translates into 
subsidiary learning. As a result, it is often “hard to link knowledge processes, such as 
knowledge transfer, to [individual] behavior” (Foss and Pedersen, 2004: 343), which hampers 
both theory development and the formulation of managerial implications. 
Second, MNE knowledge research has mainly explored the impact of social factors in 
the internal network context. For instance, social relations have been found to both facilitate 
knowledge flows between MNE units (e.g., Hansen, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Björkman et al, 2004), such as by increasing awareness of other units’ knowledge stock and 
knowledge needs (Schulz, 2003), and to affect knowledge sharing between MNE units 
directly (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009). Instead, there is much less work that looks at the 
role of social interaction within MNE units, and we consequently know relatively little about 
the extent to which knowledge transfer and adoption is contingent on subsidiaries’ social 
context. 
Finally, MNE knowledge research still pays little attention to the changes knowledge 
inflows and the receiving context undergo when transferred knowledge is integrated (Becker-
Ritterspach, 2006; Hong and Nguyen 2009). Thus, how received knowledge is translated, 
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interpreted, and locally integrated, or the transformative aspect of knowledge transfer, is 
often ignored.  
The argument developed below is that these shortcomings can be addressed both by 
more fully embracing the concept of absorptive capacity in understanding subsidiary 
learning, and by extending the concept of absorptive capacity to better understand how 
behaviour at the micro-level of individual actors translates into differences in learning 
outcomes at the subsidiary level. Although subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity is already 
recognized as one of the key factors facilitating MNE knowledge transfer (e.g. Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Minbaeva et al., 2003), the literature primarily considers absorptive 
capacity in relation to knowledge acquisition (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Which 
and how local conditions facilitate the subsequent transformation and successful application 
of new knowledge is rarely looked into. Hence, the MNE literature tends to make only partial 
use of the notion of absorptive capacity. 
This, we feel, is a missed opportunity. Absorptive capacity shares a conceptual 
affinity with organizational learning (Sun and Anderson, 2010) and, as both an antecedent 
and consequent of organizational learning processes (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006), 
absorptive capacity is well suited to enhancing our understanding of subsidiary learning. In 
particular, both the construct’s attention to local conditions and the transformative nature of 
knowledge may further our understanding of how local conditions enable or constrain 
subsidiary learning outcomes.i However, as we explain below we also claim that the notion of 
absorptive capacity needs to be extended. In particular, what remains under-addressed is how 
the actions of individual actors translate into absorptive capacity at the organizational level 
and exactly how this is contingent on the social context.  
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Absorptive capacity  
Despite differences in emphasis and more recent refinements (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; 
Todorova and Durisin, 2007), the concept of absorptive capacity essentially rests on three 
components (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990): Recognizing and acquiring new knowledge, 
processing new knowledge—labelled as assimilation and/or transformation—and putting new 
knowledge into effective use. Organizational units’ absorptive capacity first of all depends on 
prior knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990): Related knowledge facilitates the effective 
communication of new knowledge, while diversity of knowledge stimulates innovative 
application of new knowledge. Second, organizational units’ ability to absorb new knowledge 
is affected by the interface between knowledge source and receiving unit. Here, similarity 
between sending and receiving unit facilitates the effective communication of new ideas 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), while boundary spanners play the 
important role of translating and disseminating new information internally (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
In addition, absorptive capacity is also linked to local conditions (e.g., Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2005). This 
is because the ability to adopt new knowledge and practices and to put that knowledge into 
practical use depends not only on knowledge acquisition, but also on how transferred 
knowledge and practices are assimilated and/or transformed, and subsequently implemented. 
Here, both social interaction and organizational processes are argued to play a role (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010). Social interaction has been repeatedly 
linked to the ease with which the different components of absorptive capacity take place (e.g., 
Zahra and George, 2002; Todorova and Durisin, 2007). And while units’ absorptive capacity 
is a function of local actors’ individual absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), it is 
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organizational processes that “enable the organization to share, communicate, and transfer 
individual-level learning to the organizational level” (Lane et al., 2006: 846). 
 
The micro-macro link of absorptive capacity 
Applied to the context of MNEs, the notion of absorptive capacity therefore provides useful 
leads on how subsidiary-level learning outcomes relate to sub-organizational processes and 
conditions. However, two related issues also limit the explanatory potential of absorptive 
capacity in understanding subsidiary learning, namely inattentiveness in empirical studies to 
the role of social context beyond its impact on knowledge acquisition, and insufficient 
theoretical discussion of how individual behaviour translates into absorptive capacity of the 
organizational unit. 
While empirical work on absorptive capacity highlights the role of social interaction 
between sender and receiver (e.g., Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Reagans 
and McEvily, 2003; Tsai, 2002), attention to the effects of units’ internal social context has, 
with exceptions (e.g., Van den Bosch, Volberda, and De Boer, 1999; Jansen et al., 2005), 
been much more modest. In addition, researchers have traditionally adopted a relatively 
narrow view of absorptive capacity as relating to firms’ prior knowledge base—often with 
R&D intensity as a proxy—in which the organizational processes leading to knowledge 
acquisition, transformation and application are often overlooked (Lane et al., 2006). As a 
result, our understanding of how new knowledge is assimilated and the role that individual 
actors assume in this process remains limited (Volberda et al., 2010).  
This relative inattentiveness in empirical research to intra-unit social interaction is 
reflected in theoretical discussions on what constitutes absorptive capacity. The roots of 
absorptive capacity are in work on human cognition (e.g., Bower and Hilgard, 1981; Lindsay 
and Norman, 1977) and, hence, there has been much attention to the role of individual 
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capabilities. But how individual behaviour translates into absorptive capacity of the 
organizational unit is not sufficiently discussed: Although social interaction is recognized as 
linking individual behaviour to units’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), in 
most discussions the relationship between social interaction and absorptive capacity is often 
sidelined as an antecedent or merely inferred from the notion that absorptive capacity 
comprises a set of organizational routines (e.g. Zahra and George, 2002; Todorova and 
Durisin, 2007). Instead, whether and how differences in social interaction translate into 
organizational-level differences in learning outcomes remains under-addressed, and how and 
why social interaction patterns may differ is not sufficiently specified. This implies that we 
still have little knowledge of the micro-level origins of absorptive capacity at the subsidiary 
level. Therefore, we aim to explore how and why actors’ interactions shape absorptive 
capacity at the organizational level to produce different learning outcomes. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
We strive to achieve this objective through a comparative case study of the centrally initiated 
introduction of continuous improvement principles at two subsidiaries of a Dutch MNE in the 
chemical industry. Dutch Chem (a pseudonym)—a Fortune Global 500 company—employs 
62,000 people globally and operates in more than 80 countries. We selected two subsidiaries 
that differ markedly in terms of learning outcomes, although they are very similar in terms of 
characteristics that are predicted by the knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity literatures 
to affect learning outcomes (Table 1). The two subsidiaries, which are located in the UK and 
Germany and belong to the firm’s paints division, displayed similar characteristics in terms 
of transfer content, transfer channel and key characteristics of the sending and receiving unit. 
In addition, both subsidiaries were similar in size, operated in the same field of business and 
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had a comparable knowledge base and motivational disposition. Yet, as illustrated in the 
following sections, the two subsidiaries differed markedly in terms of learning outcomes. The 
case studies consisted of both field research—carried out between 2006 and 2007—and desk 
research. Field research consisted of visits to headquarters and two day-long visits, followed 
by a week-long participant observation at each subsidiary. Data collection involved 
conducting semi-structured interviews and collection of documents (see Table 2).  
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Empirical definitions 
Drawing on the three core elements of absorptive capacity, we see subsidiary learning as 
based on organizational members’ ability and motivation to acquire, transform and 
practically apply new knowledge (Minbaeva et al., 2003). In addition, similar to Szulanski’s 
(1996) concept of ‘retentive capacity’, we see the success of learning expressed in the 
transformation and sustained use of new knowledge. Thus, we consider learning outcome as 
‘extensive’ when acquired knowledge is transformed, applied and sustained in new or 
changed practice. Conversely, we consider learning as ‘limited’ when acquired knowledge is 
not transformed, applied and sustained in new or changed practice. 
Guiding the case analyses is our interest in the link between the success with which 
the transferred continuous improvement initiatives were transformed, applied and sustained, 
and the social interaction patterns at both subsidiaries. In line with Lane et al. (2006)’s view 
of transformation as relating to the combination of new with existing knowledge, we 
operationalized ‘transformation’ as a change in knowledge content resulting from local 
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reinterpretations of the continuous improvement principles. Instead, analogous to the view of 
application as the commercialization of new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et 
al., 2006), ‘application’ was deemed to have taken place if the introduction of continuous 
improvement practices resulted in the development of new practices, or in changes in old 
practices. 
Finally, we took social interaction patterns as a function of both the actors involved in 
learning activities and the relations between these actors. Although social interaction is often 
considered to facilitate access to and the acquisition of external information (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), absorptive capacity 
also relates to how knowledge is transformed and applied internally. In addition to the level 
of social cohesion among actors and the strength and persistence of social interaction 
patterns, which have both been linked with knowledge acquisition (e.g., Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003; Szulanski, 1996; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001), we 
therefore also focus on the scope of interaction, or who participates in learning activities and 
in what role (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Zahra and George, 2002).  
 
Data analysis 
The data analysis followed Eisenhardt (1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) in starting with 
within-case analysis followed by cross-case analysis. This involved first detailed and 
descriptive ‘write-ups’ for the two cases. Field notes, transcribed interviews and documents 
were manually coded according to analytical categories derived from the theoretical 
discussion (see the Appendix for an illustrative list of codes and statements denoting how 
these are related). Interviews were decomposed and chunks of coded interview-sections 
grouped according to our analytical dimensions. The reliability of the findings was enhanced 
by making explicit the procedures that were followed for data collection. For example, we 
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recorded interviews, and collected participants’ feedback on transcripts and executive 
summaries. To further ensure reliability of the data, several data quality checks were 
performed. For instance, interview data from a particular work group were checked against 
responses from another group. Similarly, subsidiary and headquarter members’ accounts 
were cross-checked. Recurring themes and categories were identified and coding checks 
during the coding process ensured agreement among research team members. 
 The second step consisted of the cross-case comparison, where the objective was to 
identify patterns of similarities and differences across cases (Ragin, 1987). Following the 
‘pattern matching logic’ (Ragin, 1987; Pauwels and Matthyssens, 2004), the final analytical 
step of this study involved investigating and exploring whether or not the differences in 
subsidiary learning could be attributed to associations between the analytical dimension of 
social interaction. This process was supported by extensive efforts of data display as 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) (see also the tables in the empirical findings 
section below). An effort was made to specify associations that were deliberately not 
explicated in the theoretical framework. Contradictions, matches and newly emerging 
associations were then fed into propositions presented in the discussion of this work 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
In response to increased competition, in 2003 the European paints division of Dutch Chem 
initiated a continuous improvement programme labelled Star Trek, which was driven by 
headquarters and involved the same approach at all sites. Sites were required to work with a 
consultancy group that focused on improving operational performance through Pareto-
analysis. This was combined with the transfer of new knowledge on continuous improvement 
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principles from headquarters to the subsidiaries through extensive documentation. The 
documentation suggested a road map, and a range of systems (such as Kaizen, Six Sigma, 
and Lean manufacturing) and tools (such as 5S and value stream mapping) that the sites 
could use to realize continuous improvement. Yet despite many similarities in terms of 
characteristics related to absorptive capacity—such as age, size, knowledge levels and 
motivation—the two subsidiaries differed considerably in the transformation and application 
of the acquired knowledge, and their learning outcome (see Table 3 for an overview). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Learning at German Sub 
Knowledge absorption at German Sub 
At the start of the Star Trek initiative German Sub was asked to reduce its production costs 
by half. Although this came as a surprise to the German management, the looming closure of 
the site proved a strong motivation to acquire the transferred knowledge. Similar to other 
sites, German Sub received key performance indicators, a road map and a range of systems 
and tools to be used to realize continuous improvement. Although the site was also required 
to involve an external consultancy firm in the initiation stage, management ended the 
consultancy firm’s involvement in the implementation stage as the “sustainability [of the 
consultancy’s solutions] went away” as they “went from one project to the other” (plant 
director).  
At German Sub, transformation of the knowledge content occurred in two ways. 
First, it manifested in a strong focus on the behavioural aspects of the Star Trek initiative, 
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with particular emphasis on changing “people’s behaviour and in creating a culture 
environment” (plant director). New behavioural guidelines were developed to facilitate 
continuous improvement behaviour in daily operations (Master Plan Continuous 
Improvement Germany). The resulting “Production role model Cologne”, called for 
employee openness for change, emphasized their responsibility to contribute to 
improvements, and highlighted managers’ responsibility to create a work environment that 
facilitates employee involvement. In addition, Star Trek was reframed and translated into 
various local visions and slogans, as it was argued that “you have to get people’s attention 
and you cannot get their attention with something they don’t grasp or associate with” 
(factory manager).  ”Star Trek” was substituted by the strategic vision “Cologne is a leading 
production site for paint” with the guiding slogan “Cologne: Impossible is nothing”. At the 
level of operators, it translated into the slogan “We Colognians hand in hand” and featured 
the image of the dome of Cologne. 
Second, transformation of the original content also manifested in the partial selection 
and adaptation of the systems and tools suggested in the Star Trek documentation. Managers 
at German Sub found it neither feasible nor necessary to adopt all systems and tools, such as 
Lean, Six Sigma, TPM, and TQM. These were considered to share “the notion to approach 
things in a structured way” (factory manager), and were seen as “a reference and way of 
thinking to move forward” (Masterplan continuous improvement Germany) rather than as 
systems to be meticulously implemented (factory manager). Moreover, selected tools, such 
as 5S, were reinterpreted. A Master craftsman explained: 
“We call it S4S, Standards for Safety. 5S is the standard understanding which was 
originally introduced by Toyota and zealously followed since, all the way down to 
organizing your desk and defining a position for your pen. I am a big fan of 
imitation. Now, if someone had a good idea and we try to take that on board one on 
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one, this is not possible. Because each plant is different. I can get ideas from 
somewhere else, but I then have to see what fits my system best.” 
 
Application of the new behavioural guidelines and adapted systems was reflected in 
new improvement practices. For example, improvement practices changed from a 
“bureaucratic and cumbersome” suggestion scheme (operator), to sustained continuous 
improvement practices manifesting in “simple orders for the workshop” (group advisor). 
Specific applications included changed filling processes for acticides, filter renewal, eye 
shower installations, piping to reduce yeast and the development of a system to track the 
service level. Not only did these improvements outlast the end of the Star Trek initiative at 
the subsidiary, but the implementation of continuous improvement principles also proved 
sustainable after the initiative had died down at corporate headquarters. Thus, the German 
subsidiary not only engaged in extensive transformation of the transfer knowledge, but was 
also able to apply this knowledge in the form of changed and sustained local practices. 
 
Social interaction at German Sub 
The extensive transformation and application of Star Trek principles at the German 
subsidiary crucially rested on the participation of a wide scope of internal actors, in terms of 
functional and hierarchical diversity, and large-scale cross-functional and –hierarchical 
integration and interaction. 
First, transformation of the Star Trek initiative involved a wide scope of participating 
actors with different functional backgrounds from across the hierarchical range. While top 
management transformed the Star Trek principles into a strategic vision, middle management 
and, in particular, first-line supervisors crucially transformed the vision into behavioural 
guidelines and day-to-day improvements. Operators were asked to participate in transforming 
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the vision into behavioural guidelines and continuous improvement routines, as it was widely 
recognized that they “know three times more than the stupid manager knows” (factory 
manager). In the words of one group advisor, when it comes to “machine knowledge and 
understanding the problems, there the man in the line knows best and one has to appreciate 
that”. Appreciation of operator participation was reflected in the perception where 
improvements originated from: “A bit comes from the leader-level in filling and in 
production, but for the most part it comes from the people working on the machines day-in 
day out and say: ‘Listen, I have a problem here can’t we do this or that’.” (factory manager). 
Involvement of the local work council also proved instrumental, as it secured the 
participation of operators while protecting their interests. 
Transformation and application of the continuous improvement principles also rested 
on strong social cohesion. The cross-hierarchical cohesion at the German site stemmed to a 
large degree from the low professional distance between middle management and supervisors 
and to operators on the shop floor, owing to their own technical or vocational training and 
careers. In addition, operators, supervisors and maintenance staff worked in close physical 
proximity and under the same managerial authority, which promoted social cohesion among 
the different occupational groups. Moreover, there were few demarcations between the 
members of different shifts as personnel shifted back and forth on a continuous basis. Finally, 
the relationship between management and the work council, described by management as a 
constructive relationship “of give and take” (factory manager), added to social cohesion and 
to an increase in mutual trust between management and labour.  
 Furthermore, the scale of social interaction related to improvement activity was not 
spatially or temporally confined. After the initial failure to sustain the improvement projects 
initiated by the consultancy firm, improvement activities were deliberately not confined to 
any particular group or project. Instead, efforts were made to realize improvement activity 
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throughout the organization, and at the time of research a continuous improvement culture 
had materialized in which extensive cross-functional and -hierarchical interaction had 
become part of daily work. For instance, employees had become more aware of whether 
problems encountered in other departments were “comparable or even identical to those 
[they] have, and [whether they could] try to solve these problems with a common approach” 
(group advisor), which increased interaction with other functional departments. Similarly, 
when operators encountered production problems, they would now “simply walk into the 
production supervisors’ office” (operator) who would then personally contact the 
maintenance supervisor. 
 
Organizational conditions at German Sub 
The comprehensive social interaction pattern at German Sub was facilitated by organizational 
conditions that enabled and encouraged the participation of employees in transforming the 
Star Trek principles. These conditions included a participatory leadership style, limited 
structural demarcations and a changed incentive system (Table 4). 
First, the site manager of the German subsidiary was a proponent of participatory 
leadership. This had led to the parting with the external consultancy which “did not care 
about people” (plant director), and several middle managers who were seen to obstruct 
participatory leadership had been replaced. A vital part of the leadership style consisted of 
open communication. It was openly communicated that Star Trek and the improvements that 
potentially resulted from it could lead to job losses. At the same time, redundancies, contrary 
to what Star Trek documents suggested, were seen as a last resort. This in turn secured trust, 
which increased social cohesion and the willingness within the workforce to further 
participate in improvement processes. As one interviewee put it: “The whole thing [...] builds 
19 
 
on trust, no matter whether you communicate something nice or bad. Employees have to, or 
not just employees, the whole team, has to have trust in each other” (group advisor). 
 Second, participatory leadership was supported by limited structural demarcations. 
For example, vertical demarcations were reduced by devolving responsibility from 
supervisors to groups of operators headed by a group speaker. While the role of the 
supervisors had shifted to a more advisory role, the remaining supervisors still formed an 
important link between workers and middle management. Regarding horizontal 
demarcations, the integration of the maintenance unit into production proved crucial. Before, 
production groups had been strictly separated into departments—there had been “a wall 
between different departments” (operator)—, and the head of maintenance controlled and 
approved all process changes. Integration of the two units not only reduced this hierarchy but 
also “internalized the interface” between maintenance and production (group advisor), which 
facilitated cross-functional interaction. Overall, the structural changes reduced organizational 
demarcations. This facilitated a climate for social interaction and cohesion across functions, 
departments and hierarchical levels.  
On top of the structural changes and participatory leadership style, social interaction 
among different occupational groups in the newly composed production department was also 
facilitated by the introduction of a common “group-bonus system” (works council). The 
group bonus system enhanced social interaction as “fitters react to any gout now” (operator), 
and encouraged “people [to] think and cooperate across shifts and departments”, which 
signalled increased social interaction and cohesion. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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Learning at UK Sub 
 
Knowledge absorption at UK Sub 
Confronted with decreased production volumes and the threat of closure, UK Sub was 
motivated by similar incentives as German Sub to acquire and adopt the Star Trek principles. 
Similar to the German subsidiary, the UK subsidiary was briefed on the Star Trek initiative 
by headquarters and received extensive documentation. This was then followed by site visits 
by the consultancy firm involved in the early phase of the implementation process. At the UK 
site, the information on Star Trek was disseminated top-down through meetings and 
briefings, and several consultancy firms provided additional seminars and training modules 
on continuous improvement and lean manufacturing. 
At UK Sub, transformation of the transferred knowledge was more superficial, and 
resulted primarily in a strong focus on performance indicators, such as service levels and 
stock levels. The reinterpretation of the Star Trek principles saw heavy involvement of 
external consultancy firms and predominantly manifested itself in ambitious target-setting 
and technical adaptations. For instance, standard operating procedures were redesigned and, 
on the initiative of the improvement manager of the paints division, work started on the 
creation of a ‘5C’ area based on the 5S principles of workplace design. A consultancy firm 
set new production targets which, together with work schedules and performance indicators, 
were posted on notice boards on the shop floor. Operators followed training programmes to 
improve technical skills and multi-skilling. The training programmes also created awareness 
of the importance of a clean workplace and a “mental recognition of the importance of zero 
stock” (shift leader). Finally, employees were offered the possibility to create and volunteer 
for process improvement groups (PIGs) to encourage incremental improvements. 
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However, whereas at German Sub the locally developed continuous improvement 
practices outlasted the Star Trek initiative, the local applications developed at the UK site 
failed to institutionalize, and the continuous improvement initiative was not sustained. For 
instance, the implementation of ‘5C’ areas was discontinued after the responsible consultancy 
firm and improvement manager left the site. Although one corner of the ground floor had 
been successfully transformed into a ‘5C’ area, the initiative did not produce the intended 
shop floor-wide shift in attitude. In the words of one operator: “if you spill there [the 5C 
area], you clean it up; but if you spill somewhere else, you just leave it”.  
Along similar lines, the communication of targets and schedules through notice 
boards did little to motivate the operators, and even became a source of frustration. For 
example, workers on the shop floor indicated that the new externally-set filling speed was 
unrealistic, because “at that speed, paint would spill over the cans” (team leader). As an 
operator explained, “the target filling speed set by [the consultancy firm] is set at 40 tins per 
minute, whereas we can normally and reasonably do 22-28, perhaps 30.” Management 
nonetheless decided to leave the new target filling speed unchanged, with the result that on 
occasion “numbers were reported while the machine hadn’t even operated” (team leader). 
In addition, many of the redesigned standard operating procedures (SOPs) were not 
applied and sustained in practice. Newly introduced SOPs were noted but not adhered to by 
operators. One operator explained that “they are brought in, people hear about it, but people 
tend to do it their own way”, and that operators often “cut corners” to “get the job done”. 
Furthermore, SOPs were not communicated to new employees, even though new operators 
underwent extensive on-the-job training programmes. For example, when asked about SOPs, 
one of the new operators replied: “nobody has ever told me. You do what you see other 
people do.” Similarly, another operator explained that “everybody has his own way, and 
people are trained differently”. 
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Overall, the UK site showed limited transformation and application of the Star Trek 
initiative. Although many operators underwent some form of training in the light of HQ’s 
Star Trek initiative, over half of the operators interviewed were unaware of Star Trek or its 
principles, and those who were aware often claimed to “do very little differently” (operator) 
compared with before. In all, in the words of the business unit’s improvement manager: “If I 
had [to rate the extent to which the principles had been taken on board on] a scale from 1 to 
10, then I would say we are on 1 out of 10”.  
 
Social interaction at UK Sub 
A striking difference with the German site was the scope of actors involved in the 
acquisition, transformation, and application of the Star Trek principles, which remained 
largely in the hands of management and external consultants. External consultants suggested 
setting new production targets and using visual communication. Education on ‘zero stock’ 
was provided by an external institute, and new cleanliness and safety measures were imposed 
by external consultancy firms. Even the re-writing of SOPs saw little involvement of 
experienced operators. Some operators initiated and participated in process improvement 
groups, but these mainly focused on incremental improvements such as waste recycling in the 
canteen. Thus, although many operators participated in the externally organized training 
programmes, operators were, for the most part, not involved in translating the Star Trek 
principles at the UK site. As one operator commented, “Many of the suggestions made by [an 
external consultancy firm] had already been made by other operators ... but had not been 
acted on by management”.  
In addition, social cohesion at the UK site was compartmentalized and characterized 
by strong hierarchical and moderate functional divides. Contrary to the German site, 
management was not involved with the shop floor and preferred communication via e-mail. 
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In addition, management—which often socialized after work—was perceived to 
unconditionally side with shift supervisors (lower management) in the case of conflict, and 
preferred to distance itself from shop floor activities. Among operators, on the other hand, 
there was a strong culture of “not telling on your colleague” and a strong sense of distrust 
towards management. The strong degree of demarcation at the UK site severely hampered 
cross-hierarchical and cross-functional communication. Operators frequently complained 
about the lack of information from management, claiming: “We just don’t find out!” 
(operator), and expressed their frustration that suggestions from the shop floor were rarely 
taken on board. 
Finally, interaction across functional and hierarchical groups was limited in scale and 
strongly tied to individual projects. Whereas at the German site interaction across hierarchical 
and functional levels had become commonplace, at the UK site, improvement initiatives were 
infrequent and limited in time. For instance, the involvement of consultants at the UK site 
was time-bound by nature, and produced piece-meal solutions such as setting over-ambitious 
targets or filling speeds. Similarly, process improvement groups (PIGs), which often involved 
actors from different functional areas, would dissolve when a problem had been resolved. 
This limited the ability of actors to engage in the transformation and application of the Star 
Trek principles beyond the specific task of the group. In addition, the PIGs were particularly 
vulnerable to time and resource shortages because they were not part of day-to-day work. 
They were often neglected when time and personnel shortages increased, which contributed 
to the fact that “the PIGs died before they started” (operator). 
 
Organizational conditions at UK Sub 
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The limited scope of social interaction at UK Sub reflected the absence of organizational 
conditions that would enable and encourage the participation of employees in transforming 
the Star Trek principles. 
First, in contrast to German Sub, there was little sign of participatory leadership. 
Instead, management’s approach to managing operations was distinctly hands-off, with 
operators suggesting that management had “no clear idea of what people are actually doing” 
and that “a lot of people can get away with things, work-wise”. In addition, lower 
management was often perceived to rely on ‘divide-and-conquer’ tactics. For instance, 
management suggested that the more vocal blue shift was a problem-shift, even though 
performance indicators on the notice boards did not indicate any actual performance 
difference between the two shifts. Even headquarters characterized management at the UK 
site as “very traditional, political animals [and] not very good listeners” (European 
Improvement Manager).  
A second constraint on widespread social interaction and involvement at UK Sub was 
the sharp structural demarcation between functional areas. Whereas at German Sub 
structural demarcations had gradually dissolved (following, for instance, the integration of 
maintenance and production), at UK Sub, strong structural demarcations continued to exist. 
For instance, maintenance and quality control operated independently from the shop floor, 
outside the shift-structure, and were physically removed from the production line. Even 
operators of different functional areas on the same shift had little need or opportunity for 
cross-functional cooperation on the job. This severely limited social interaction and the 
integration of maintenance and production know-how. 
Finally, participation in the transformation of the Star Trek principles was not 
supported by an incentive system. Contrary to German Sub, at UK Sub there was no bonus 
system for meeting performance targets. Rather, for operators, the implementation of Star 
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Trek resulted in a loss in shift payments, and the operators could not help but equate 
improvement with job loss. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
What emerges from the findings is that the difference in learning outcomes at the two 
subsidiaries is inherently linked to differences in social interaction among the actors involved 
in learning activities (Table 5). At German Sub, where learning was extensive, actors from 
across the hierarchical range were involved in the transformation and application of the Star 
Trek initiative. There was a strong sense of social cohesion, and frequent—sustained—
interaction between employees on issues related to the transfer initiative. Instead, at UK Sub, 
the transfer initiative was not sustained. Here the transfer initiative saw little involvement of 
operators, and there was little social cohesion due to strong hierarchical and functional 
demarcation. In addition, cross-functional interaction was usually project-based and short-
lived. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We draw on social perspectives on learning to shed light on why the different climates for 
social interaction translated into different learning outcomes (e.g., Gherardi and Nicolini, 
2001; Elkjaer, 2005). Social perspectives on learning have recently received more attention in 
the literature on MNE knowledge processes (e.g. Hong et al., 2006a,b; Saka-Helmhout, 2007; 
Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009). Such perspectives highlight that “learning does not take 
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place solely or principally in the minds of individuals but rather stems from the participation 
of individuals in social activities” (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2001: 35). For organizational 
learning to be extensive, knowledge must be integrated locally: It must be acquired, 
transformed, and subsequently applied and sustained in actual practice, which inherently rests 
on social interaction. In other words, organizational learning is a social rather than an 
individual exercise, and therefore the locus of organizational learning is not the mind of the 
individual but rather the “participation patterns of individual members of organizations in 
which learning takes place” (Elkjaer, 2005: 43). 
This suggests that the social interaction pattern at German Sub led to extensive 
learning because it enabled employees with diverse knowledge to engage in the 
transformation of the transfer content, and in the development of applications which were 
truly local and which workers perceived as their own. The case findings suggest that it is not 
merely the scale or extent of interaction but also its scope, or the diversity of interacting 
actors, that matters: At UK Sub, where participation in learning activities was limited to 
management and external consultants, the acquired knowledge underwent very little 
transformation. Applications of the acquired knowledge were relatively generic in nature, and 
remained close to the original Star Trek initiative. Instead, at German Sub, the participation 
of and interaction among a wide range of local actors resulted in the substantial 
transformation of the acquired knowledge, and in the development of applications that were 
both innovative and local. Thus, while knowledge stocks of the subsidiaries were 
comparable, at German Sub, the scale and scope of interaction enabled the participation of 
employees with diverse backgrounds. This, we theorize, explains the link between the 
observed differences in social interaction climates and learning outcomes. 
The implication we draw for understanding the micro-macro dynamics of absorptive 
capacity is that organization level absorptive capacity is a function of both the motivation and 
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the prior knowledge of employees who participate in learning activities (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Minbaeva et al., 2003), and of the social interaction patterns between these 
employees. While absorptive capacity at the individual level largely depends on individuals’ 
knowledge structures (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), absorptive capacity at the subsidiary level 
is not simply the sum of the knowledge and capabilities of individual employees. 
Successfully assimilating or accommodating external knowledge in new or existing schemata 
may lead individual employees to develop intuitive insights and innovations (cf. Todorova 
and Durisin, 2007), but the shared understanding and justification of new knowledge required 
for group problem solving and the joint development of local applications is produced in 
dialogue and social interaction (e.g., Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999; Yakhlef, 2010). Thus, 
the depth and diversity of knowledge of motivated employees only translates into absorptive 
capacity of the organizational unit if the scope of social interaction patterns surrounding 
knowledge activities also enables these employees to engage in the transformation of new 
knowledge. 
Furthermore, while social cohesion impacts employees’ motivation to engage in 
knowledge activities (Reagans and McEvily, 2003), the scale or extent of social interaction 
affects the extent of knowledge transformation and the development of local applications 
through, for instance, its impact on the quality of dialogue and the efficiency and pace with 
which shared local interpretations emerge (e.g. Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003; Crossan et al., 
1999; Yeoh, 2009; Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). Thus, the larger the scale and scope of 
social interaction surrounding learning-related activities, the more extensive the 
transformation that new knowledge can undergo, and the more extensive local applications 
ariseii. This leads us to propose the following: 
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Proposition 1: Subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity is positively related to the scale and scope 
of social interaction and the degree of cohesion among employees.  
 
A key reason for the difference in social interaction patterns lies in the organizational 
conditions at both subsidiaries. At German Sub, local conditions such as participative 
leadership, the incentive system and low structural demarcation encouraged social interaction 
across hierarchical and functional divides, and thus facilitated the ability and willingness of 
employees to participate in the transformation of new knowledge. At UK Sub, however, such 
enabling organizational conditions were largely absent, which contributed to the lack of 
involvement of operators in the transformation of the Star Trek principles. In the context of 
absorptive capacity, research has predominantly focused on the organizational conditions that 
influence individual employee abilities and motivation. But similar to that “neither 
employees’ ability nor motivation by themselves is sufficient to facilitate knowledge 
transfer” (Minbaeva et al., 2003: 596), the ability and motivation of individual employees 
only contributes to absorptive capacity at the subsidiary level if employees are also enabled 
and motivated to engage in the transformation of new knowledge. The case findings illustrate 
the influence of organizational conditions on subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity where they 
enable and motivate social interaction and participation for the adoption, transformation and 
application of knowledge. This leads to the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: The impact of organizational conditions that enable employees to engage in 
the transformation and application of new knowledge on subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity is 
positively mediated by the scale and scope of social interaction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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While the importance of MNE knowledge processes is widely recognized (e.g., Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Grant, 1996), we still know little about the role of local actors in these 
processes and how this is contingent on organizational conditions. Although the notion of 
absorptive capacity may partially address these issues, the absorptive capacity literature itself 
is unclear about the role of social interaction and is inattentive to how individual behaviour 
translates to absorptive capacity at the organizational level. This study makes several 
contributions to the advancement of both the IB knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity 
literature. 
First, this study provides qualitative evidence of the importance of the participation 
patterns of local actors and of social dynamics in understanding subsidiary learning. In 
particular, the case findings suggest that different patterns of social interaction are related to 
the variation in subsidiaries’ ability to adopt and apply new knowledge. Social interaction 
enables local actors to participate in the transformation of new knowledge at the local context 
and is therefore crucial in ensuring that individual absorptive capacity translates into 
absorptive capacity at the organizational level. Thus, while previous studies argue that 
internal social interaction patterns affect units’ absorptive capacity indirectly, by facilitating 
knowledge sharing and promoting mutual understanding (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; 
Todorova and Durisin, 2007), this study illustrates that social interaction constitutes a key 
link between the micro- and the macro-level, and is therefore a key requirement for 
organizational absorptive capacity.  
Second, we illustrated that to understand how and why social interaction is enabled or 
constrained, it is crucial to consider organizational conditions. As the case findings suggest, 
the ability and motivation of individual employees only contributes to absorptive capacity at 
the subsidiary level if employees are also enabled and motivated by organizational conditions 
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to engage in the transformation of knowledge. Thus, our study adds to a growing number of 
studies that call for a micro-perspective to understanding IB knowledge processes (e.g. Foss 
and Pedersen, 2004; Minbaeva et al., 2003) by suggesting how differences in certain 
organizational conditions, such as leadership style and structural demarcations, lead to 
differences in the absorptive capacity of MNE subsidiaries. Specifically, it supports and 
extends the notion that the impact of organizational conditions on organizational knowledge 
processes may be crucially mediated by social structure (Gooderham et al., 2011). 
Third, our study illustrates how making better use of the notion of absorptive capacity 
to understand MNE knowledge processes also draws attention to the transformative aspect of 
knowledge transfer. As highlighted at the beginning of this paper, MNE knowledge research 
has thus far paid limited attention to the concurring change of both knowledge content and 
receiving context in the process of external knowledge integration. Successful transformation 
and application of the transferred knowledge does not merely imply change in knowledge 
content, but also change in practices, organizational conditions and, possibly, social 
interaction patterns of the receiving context. This, in turn, may impact the absorptive capacity 
of the receiving unit. Although we focused on just one knowledge transfer initiative, the 
change in organizational conditions at German Sub illustrates part of this recursive 
relationship between absorptive capacity and organizational learning (e.g., Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006), where absorptive capacity is both an antecedent and 
consequent of learning rather than “a “thing” that is divorced of its context” (Lane et al., 
2006: 858). As Sun and Anderson (2010) indicate, examining the relation between absorptive 
capacity and learning processes therefore holds considerable promise for enhancing our 
understanding of (subsidiary) learning outcomes. 
The results of this study have several important implications for practitioners. As 
others have demonstrated, the ability of organizational units to acquire and apply new 
31 
 
knowledge is positively related to learning (e.g., Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001), innovativeness 
(e.g., Lichtenthaler, 2009; Tsai, 2001) and profitability (e.g., Bergh and Lim, 2008; 
Lichtenthaler, 2009; Tsai, 2001). This study illustrates that organizational conditions that 
facilitate and encourage social interaction among employees are key to organizational units’ 
absorptive capacity. As argued in both the absorptive capacity and the social learning 
literatures, new knowledge needs to be transformed at the local context in order to be 
accepted and successfully applied. Social interaction among employees, in terms of both 
scale (that is, the extent of social interaction) and scope (that is, diversity in employee 
backgrounds and roles), is a prerequisite for this. The acceptance and application of new 
knowledge can be actively encouraged and facilitated by practicing managers through, for 
instance, the adoption and promotion of a participatory leadership style, limiting of structural 
demarcations between functional areas, and the development of appropriate incentive 
systems, such as group bonus systems that reward collective rather than individual 
performance. 
Our results also give rise to several new directions for further research. First, as the 
key strength of case-based research is in theory building rather than theory testing (e.g., 
Ghauri, 2004; Siggelkow, 2007), we encourage quantitative studies to examine the extent to 
which the case findings can be generalized. Second, although the organizational conditions 
identified in this study emerged as the most relevant to understanding the difference in social 
interaction patterns between the focal subsidiaries, it is likely that other factors, such as HRM 
practices, also impact social interaction (Leana and Van Buren, 1999). We, therefore, also 
encourage further work on the interplay between social interaction patterns and 
organizational conditions in order to gain more comprehensive insight into the contingencies 
that structure social interaction patterns. In addition, it would be wrong to assume that 
subsidiaries operate in a vacuum. A related question therefore is how the wider cultural and 
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institutional environment in turn shapes such organizational contingency factors. Finally, 
although social perspectives on MNE knowledge processes are still relatively scarce, such 
studies are on the rise (e.g., Hong et al., 2006a; Saka-Helmhout, 2009). As this study 
illustrated, by highlighting how local actors and local conditions affect learning at the 
organizational level, social learning perspectives may prove valuable in future studies to 
better understand both the role of local actors and organizational conditions in MNE 
knowledge processes. 
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Table 1: Key subsidiary characteristics  
 German subsidiary UK subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
characteristics 
 
  
Size 411 employees 
 
324 employees 
 
Acquired by 
Dutch Chem 
1998 1994 
Activities Wall paint and lacquer plant 
 
Wall paint and lacquer plant 
 
Skill levels 
 
Majority of workers semi-skilled, 
with an average of 18 years of 
employment in the subsidiary 
 
Majority of workers semi-skilled, 
with an average of 15 years of 
employment in the subsidiary  
 
Technology 
 
Semi-automated mixing and 
filling units 
Semi-automated mixing and filling 
units 
Context High threat of plant closure and 
massive job loss, strong sense of 
competition between sites 
 
High threat of plant closure and 
massive job loss, strong sense of 
competition between sites 
 
   
Knowledge 
transfer 
initiative 
 
  
Knowledge 
content 
Continuous improvement 
principles 
Continuous improvement 
principles 
Sending unit  Headquarters Headquarters 
Transfer channel Documentation, personnel 
transfer, local workshops 
Documentation, personnel transfer, 
local workshops 
Learning 
outcome 
Extensive transformation and 
application of the transfer 
initiative 
Limited transformation and 
application of the transfer initiative 
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Table 2: Overview of informants and secondary data 
 
Headquarters German subsidiary UK subsidiary 
Informants Supply Chain Europe 
Director* 
Site Manager* Site Manager* 
 
 European Improvement 
Manager* 
Plant Director* Operations Director* 
  2 Factory Managers*  
  2 Group Advisors* 2 Shift Managers* 
  HR Manager* 3 Team leaders  
  10 Operators  12 Operators  
    
Documents Organization charts 
 
Organization charts 
 
Organization charts 
 
 Star Trek Roadmap 
(Outline of Star Trek 
initiative: Vision, 
Objectives, Targets, 
Action Plans, 
Improvements) 
 
Master Plan Continuous 
Improvement Germany 
 
Master Plan Continuous 
Improvement UK 
 
 Star Trek strategy 
paper (Production and 
Logistics Strategy of 
Division for Europe) 
 
Production Role Model 
Cologne (behavioural 
guidelines) 
 
Documentation on 
Standard Operating 
Procedures 
 
  Graphs on production 
related indicators  
 
Graphs on production 
related indicators 
 
 Newsletters of Division 
Production, Logistics 
and Supply Chain 
 
Newsletter of local site 
 
 
*Formal interviews of between 30 minutes and 2 hours. 
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Table 3: Overview of knowledge absorption and learning outcomes at the two subsidiaries 
 Knowledge absorption Learning outcome Representative informant quotes 
 Acquired knowledge 
Transformation of 
acquired knowledge Local applications   
 
UK Sub 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
systems and tools: 
 
 Kaizen 
 Six Sigma 
 5S 
 Lean 
manufacturing 
 
 
 
Focus on key 
performance 
indicators 
 
Focus on incremental 
technical 
improvements 
 
Recognition of 
importance of 
cleanliness 
 
External target-
setting 
 
Communication of 
targets and schedules 
 
Redesign of Standard 
Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) 
 
Formation of process 
improvement groups 
 
Limited learning 
 
 Superficial 
knowledge 
transformation 
such as not 
adhering to the 
newly introduced 
SOPs 
 
 Applications of 
transfer 
knowledge not 
sustained such as 
the 
discontinuation of 
the 5C principles 
 
 
‘We can’t produce that fast 
because at that speed, paint 
would spill over the cans’ 
 
‘There are graphs on the wall, but 
I don’t understand them’ 
 
 ‘they [SOPs] are brought in, 
people hear about it, but people 
tend to do it their own way’  
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German 
Sub 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
systems and tools: 
 
 Kaizen 
 Six Sigma 
 5S Lean 
manufacturing 
 
Shift in focus towards 
behavioural aspects 
of continuous 
improvement 
 
Selective adoption of 
tools and systems 
 
Adaptation of 
adopted tools and 
systems 
 
Relabeling of Star 
Trek to enhance the 
meaning of the 
continuous 
improvement 
programme for local 
workers 
 
Efforts to create a 
continuous 
improvement culture 
 
Formulation of new 
behavioural standards
 
Incremental 
adaptations in 
practices and routines 
to improve 
production, 
cleanliness and safety
 
Extensive learning 
 
 Extensive 
knowledge 
transformation  
 
 Local 
applications 
sustained, 
outlasting the 
Star Trek 
initiative 
 
‘They have translated our whole 
Star Trek program into their own 
program for the Cologne site, 
with a vision, with how they 
operate, what they do, how they 
measure the success’ 
 
‘If a production run fails, costing 
about 30.000 to 40.000 Euros, 
workers are not punished 
anymore. Instead, they enter the 
office without hesitation and 
admit something has gone 
wrong.’ 
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Table 4: Social interaction patterns and organizational conditions 
 Social interaction patterns 
 
Scope of 
participating 
actors 
Social cohesion Scale of social interaction 
 
German site 
 
 
Actors across the 
hierarchical 
range; limited 
involvement of 
external 
consultants 
 
Strong hierarchical 
and functional 
integration 
 
Cross-hierarchical 
and cross-functional 
day-to-day 
interaction  
UK site 
 
Largely limited to 
management and 
external 
consultants 
Weak integration with 
shop floor; strong 
hierarchical 
demarcation 
Project-based; cross-
hierarchical and 
functional interaction 
on temporary basis 
only 
 Organizational conditions 
 Leadership style Structural demarcation Incentive system 
 
German site 
 
 
Participatory 
leadership style, 
open 
communication 
 
Low vertical and 
horizontal structural 
demarcations 
 
A group-bonus 
system based on 
performance of the 
entire factory  
UK site 
 
Hands-off 
leadership style, 
divide-and-
conquer tactics 
High structural 
demarcation between 
functional areas 
No incentive system, 
implementation of 
Star Trek hand-in-
hand with a loss in 
shift payments  
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Table 5: Summary of findings 
 
Learning outcome Social interaction Organizational conditions 
German 
site 
Extensive 
transformation and 
sustained application 
of transfer knowledge  
Extensive in scale and 
scope, strong cohesion 
Supportive organizational 
conditions that enabled and 
encouraged participation  
UK site Limited 
transformation and 
limited sustained 
application of transfer 
knowledge  
Limited in scale, scope 
and cohesion 
Unsupportive 
organizational conditions 
that hindered participation  
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APPENDIX: Illustrative list of codes 
Main 
categories 
Sub-categories Illustrations German Sub Illustrations UK Sub 
Absorptive 
capacity 
Acquisition “We had some problems in our German operation to be 
profitable in the market, so there was a lot of pressure 
on the German site to improve.” 
“It was to believe in something or to leave the 
company. That is where it started with me [the plant 
manager]. And then I tried to get some people who 
wanted to start the same dream.” 
“We have been putting a lot of effort in conveying the 
message to all levels of the organisation, I think we 
have spent hell of a lot of time and effort in conveying 
the message that basically this is a good thing, 
because we are not going to close your site down. You 
will get a chance. If we do the right steps in the right 
order and we show results, then we are away, we are 
flying. That message has been communicated top 
down pretty good I think.” 
 
 Transformation “[The people at German Sub] have translated our 
whole Star Trek program into their own program for 
the Cologne site, with a vision, with how they operate, 
what they do, how they measure the success” 
“I would say that ‘Star Trek’ has no meaning for the 
people. I know that other sites did that differently but 
we very deliberately took the decision not to sell it 
under the label Star Trek.” 
 
“There is a lot from headquarters that is relevant but we 
are asked further questions like ‘Where do you see 
yourself in the future? What is your local vision?’ We 
don’t know how these translate to the operational 
level.” 
“Either principles have not been translated into shop 
floor objectives or there is a fear factor at first-line 
and middle management levels.” 
 
 Application “Earlier, if a change in the recipe was required because 
it didn’t work … it was difficult to discuss these 
changes with the laboratory. They didn’t care much or 
were not very responsive to the demands and 
requirements of producing a recipe that works well in 
“We have made a few demonstrations, improvement 
projects here and there. But it has not become a way 
of life” 
 “[New standard operating procedures] are brought in, 
people hear about it, but people tend to do it their own 
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the laboratory to the large scale of production. This 
has changed fundamentally” 
“The resolutions of problems and changes to the 
process have gotten much faster and more flexible” 
 
way”  
 “We can’t produce that fast [at the newly imposed 
target filling speed] because at that speed, paint would 
spill over the cans” 
 
Social 
interaction 
patterns 
Participating 
actors 
“[Some of the new initiatives] come from the leader-
level in filling and in production, but for the most part 
it comes from the people working on the machines 
who work with them day-in day-out with them and 
say ‘Listen, I have a problem here can’t we do this or 
that’. Most of the time it comes from the shop floor.” 
“In my view the role model has been developed out of 
the midst of the site.” 
 
“Many of the suggestions made by [the external 
consultancy firm] had already been made by other 
operators … but had not been acted on by 
management” 
“I was involved in rewriting [standard operating 
procedures] at [my previous job], where they use the 
exact same machine as well and where I used to be a 
training officer, but I am not involved in the rewriting 
here.” 
 Social cohesion “that’s the nice thing, now they all help each other. 
Earlier the colouring guy wore the colouring hat and 
would say ‘why should I carry the barrel?’ ” 
“For me it was important, when you were in the past in 
the factory building: here was the mixing process, 
here the colouring process and here the filling. These 
were three levels. When the one pushed the barrel 
wagon, the barrel, the other one did this and a third 
one did that and they didn’t help each other much.” 
 
“Higher management should have an independent 
position [but] they unconditionally side with lower 
management ... because lower and higher 
management are friends; [they] hang out together” 
“We call them [names], they call us” 
 Strength and 
persistence of 
social 
interaction 
“I now call [a group advisor] and say ‘Listen, I have a 
big problem downstairs at the robot-palletizer, can 
you please send someone there?’ and he also sees or 
identifies this for himself as the main problem. And 
“Most of the time we hear things by word of mouth 
rather than through briefings or notes. I’m briefed 
about two times a year, if I’m lucky.” 
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that’s what we have achieved.” 
 
“The PIGs [cross-functional process improvement 
groups] died before they started” 
Organizational 
conditions 
Structural 
demarcation 
“Just an example, the reorganization of the 
maintenance department. … This reorganization is 
also a change of pattern. We used [some] out of the 
[original] team, the rest we split over the factory and 
integrated into the process. That brought instability 
because the factory leader was all of a sudden 
responsible for maintenance, and the maintenance 
people all of a sudden, when there was no … down 
time or whatever, they were also expected to … to 
produce the product.” 
  
“[The new shift manager] doesn’t really know what’s 
going on, because [he] came from maintenance rather 
than from the shop floor.” 
 Leadership style “The most important thing is that you take people on 
board; if you don’t do that you don’t even have to 
start ... . you have to listen to them , you have to talk 
to them  and you have to give feedback be it positive 
or negative.”  
 
“[Management] should listen more, because currently 
management does not listen to suggestions and 
operatives are not asked about issues.” 
 Incentive 
system 
“People perceive these things [bonuses] and are now 
really capable to select themselves what are the things 
that maybe hurt me and which are the things we can 
say ‘OK, let’s not make a fuss over it.’” 
“They were also integrated into the group-bonus 
system. They get their fair share if performance is 
alright and that has its Eigendynamic [own dynamics]. 
All discussion aside that money is just a short term 
motivation; but it motivates the people quite a lot.” 
“I like my new job, especially the medical care, 
pension care, health and safety. But if you work here 
for a long time, you don’t see the benefits anymore 
and just become sceptical.” 
“[The knowledge transfer initiative] has also meant a 
loss in shift payments. This was a lot of concern to the 
operators.” 
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i A valid question is how the link between absorptive capacity and organizational learning should be 
conceptualized. As Sun and Anderson (2010) note, while some authors view absorptive capacity as an 
antecedent to organizational learning (e.g., Reagans and McEvily, 2000: Szulanski, 1996), others see 
organizational learning as the antecedent (e.g., Schilling, 2002), and still others view the two concepts as having 
a recursive relationship (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Tsai, 2001). In this paper, 
we concur with the (recursive) view that a subsidiary’s capacity to acquire and utilize externally held knowledge 
is an antecedent to subsidiary learning, and in turn see subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity as generated by “socio-
psychological learning processes” (Sun and Anderson, 2010: 141) that are conditional on organizational 
conditions (Lane et al., 2006). 
 
ii It is likely that the effect of social interaction patterns on absorptive capacity is subject to diminishing returns 
due to, for instance, increased complexity and conflict as interaction becomes more extensive (e.g., Carlile, 
2002; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). 
